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1. INTRODUCTION
Developing nations have tended to view foreign investment as a
channel for releasing and augmenting domestic resources, while the de-
veloped countries have sought to increase their share of world trade
through the promotion of manufacturing, agricultural and extractive
industries by their nationals overseas.1 Moreover, the debt crises of the
developing countries, as evidenced by the rapid expansion of commer-
cial lending from 1967 to 1982, and the simultaneous decline of foreign
direct investment within the same period, have raised eyebrows as to
the wisdom of substituting commercial lending for direct investment as
the main vehicle of international resource flow. As Jurgen Voss has
noted, "Commercial lending results in liabilities of the borrower coun-
try not necessarily related to the contribution of these loans to its debt-
servicing capacity, [whereas e]quity investment establishes a claim to
repayment to the extent that it yields returns."2 It seems that prudence
points to a return to self-induced development or self-reliance, supple-
mented by such foreign direct investment as is deemed necessary or de-
sirable by the developing countries.
Both developing and developed countries have had to grapple with
policies and mechanisms for the promotion and protection of foreign
investment through the use of industrial and fiscal incentives and the
creation of a fairly protective legal regime for investment.' Some of
these protective arrangements take a unilateral form in the sense that
the steps taken involve the legislative or administrative machinery of
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1. G. MEIER, LEADING ISSUES IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 131-66 (1964);
see generally H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS (1986);
D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS (1986); C. FULDA & W.
SCHWARTZ, REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT (1970).
2. Voss, The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency: Status, Mandate,
Concept, Features, Implications, 21 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 7 (1987); WORLD BANK,
1985 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 64.
3. See generally INVESTMENT REGULATION AROUND THE WORLD (1983); THE
LAW OF TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS (V. Nanda ed. 1984).
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only one state. Examples of this approach are the national investment
codes found in host states,4 and provisions on tax credit and tax deferral
in the tax codes of home states. Other arrangements are bilateral in
character; and still others assume regional and interregional dimen-
sions.5 There are many aspects of the bilateral approach, including in-
vestment protection treaties, insurance or guarantee agreements, and
double taxation treaties.
In this article, the focus is on insurance or guarantee agreements,
along with their supportive administrative schemes. The methodology is
to analyze the main trends in these agreements by focusing on the main
issues typically covered by them, utilizing a broad sample of agreements
from different geographical, political, and ideological regions of the
world. In this way, the article seeks to capture similarities as well as
divergences in agreements reflecting north-north, south-south, north-
south, and east-west economic relationships.
2. THE CONCEPT OF INVESTMENT GUARANTEE
Investment guarantee treaties should be analyzed against the back-
drop of a related but distinct set of treaties, i.e., bilateral and multilat-
eral investment protection treaties, which purport to provide the kinds
of protection that foreign investors tend to expect from host and home
states.
Protection treaties typically give reciprocal assurances to con-
tracting states as to the treatment of investments within their borders.
They provide many protections such as national treatment and most-
favored-nation treatment; expropriation only in accordance with law,
accompanied by prompt, adequate, and effective compensation, or some
liberal variation of this formula; free transfer of dividends and proceeds
from disinvestment; subrogation of the home country's investment guar-
antee agency to the rights and claims of an investor against the expro-
priating state; and international arbitration for any disputes arising
under the treaty, subject to the prior exhaustion of reasonable local
remedies.6
On the other hand, the arrangements embodied in these protection
treaties have often been found inadequate on the ground that host states
that are parties to such treaties have nonetheless taken adverse mea-
4. See Ocran, The Legal Framework of Foreign Investment in Africa, 12
ZAMBIA L.J. 1 (1980).
5. See Ocran, Interregional Codes of Conduct for Transnational Corporations,
2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 121, 128 (1987).
6. Ocran, Bilateral Investment Protection Treaties: A Comparative Approach, 8
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. (1988) (forthcoming).
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sures against foreign investors; hence, the emergence of the investment
insurance or guarantee agreement as an additional protective instru-
ment which seeks to indemnify investors so injured, irrespective of
whether the home or host states concerned had concluded an investment
protection treaty. An analogy from the field of municipal law would be
the case of automobile owners or drivers who purchase automobile in-
surance even though there are traffic laws and the law of torts protect-
ing them from other road users." It is felt that foreign investors need a
greater measure of security and protection against non-commercial risks
in the face of growing economic and political uncertainties. While it is
possible for the foreign investor to buy private insurance against such
risks on its own,' either in its home state or in the host state or a third
state, many of them prefer government sponsored insurance or guaran-
tee schemes.
Some investors may seek government agency insurance in the hope
that the aura and clout of their home governments may assist them in
dealing with a host country government. In addition, their insurance is
backed by the full faith and credit of their national government. The
governments of capital-exporting countries insist on the conclusion of
special agreements governing insurance of foreign investment between
themselves and the investee states as a condition for insuring their na-
tional investors against these non-commercial risks.9 Such an arrange-
ment is intended to strengthen the hands of the government of the capi-
tal exporting country in making a claim when the investment of its
nationals suffers at the hands of the host government. Thus, even
though investment guarantee agreements are not a logically necessary
part of the insurance package, it has become for all practical purposes
part of the investment insurance terrain.
7. Voss has noted in relation to the establishment of MIGA:
[W]hile the [bilateral] treaties and the [UN] Code [on Transnational Cor-
porations] establish a uniform legal or quasi-legal framework for foreign
investment, MIGA is designed to act as financial intermediary between
individual host countries and investors backing up the stability of their
relationship by its guarantee.
Voss, supra note 2, at 22.
8.
A private political risk insurance market has developed since 1972 within
Lloyd's of London and in the U.S. After experiencing remarkable growth
alongside national investment guarantee agencies, the private market is
frequently shrinking as a result of underwriting losses sustained in other
areas of insurance.
Id. at 17 n.43.
9. See, e.g., Overseas Private Investment Corporation Act, 22 U.S.C. §
2193(a)(2) (Supp. 1988).
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The basic concept in the arrangement is to purchase insurance
against non-business or non-commercial risks, that is, political risks or
risks associated with the economy as a whole, and the typical parties in
this arrangement are the insured investor, the insurer and the broker or
underwriter. The rationale for excluding traditional business risks is
that investors as business people normally are presumed to be willing to
run such risks, or at least to be able to procure insurance against them
much more easily than the so-called non-commercial risks. Non-com-
mercial risks may be defined restrictively or expansively, but four cate-
gories of such risks are noted in the relevant literature.1" These are:
a) The currency transfer risk, resulting from host govern-
ment restrictions on currency conversion and transfer, as dis-
tinct from the devaluation risk."
b) The expropriation risk or the risk of loss resulting from
legislative or administrative action or omission of the host
government which has the effect of depriving the investor of
his ownership, control or substantial benefit from his
investment.' 2
10. See Convention Establishing the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency,
Oct. 11, 1985, art. 11(a), 24 I.L.M. 1598, 1611-12 [hereinafter MIGA Convention].
11. The insurer typically buys and sells currency at the prevailing rates. It bears
the devaluation risk only from the time it acquires the currency until it disposes of it.
Devaluation is generally considered a commercial risk, even though some see it as a
political risk appropriate for public guaranty coverage.
12. The "deprivation of substantial benefit" language suggests coverage for the
so-called creeping expropriation or de facto expropriation. Basically, this can be defined
as any act, or series of acts, for which the state is responsible, which are illegal under
domestic or international law, and which leave a substantial enough adverse effect on
either the enterprise or the investor's rights under the enterprise. See Weston, 'Con-
structive Takings' Under International Law: A Modest Foray Into the Problem of
'Creeping Expropriation', 16 VA. J. INT'L LAW 103, 111-13 (1975); Vagts, Coercion
and Foreign Investment Rearrangements, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 17, 25 (1978). The
obvious question is how much is "substantial" for the purpose of this coverage. A broad
range of governmental acts-from fairly direct forms of intervention to various subtle
forms of interference-have confronted investors.
Shanks gives a dramatic example of a creeping expropriation scenario: There is a
joint venture in a host country whose purpose is to catch, process and freeze seafood for
export. A new government comes to power through a coup d'etat and is very hostile to
the nationality of the foreign investors and to the local partners. Therefore it begins to
take a series of acts, some of which could be characterized as regulatory, which has the
effect of increasingly restricting the investment:
First, the expatriate manager and his family were threatened with physi-
cal harm; they packed up and left. Second, an expatriate refrigeration ex-
pert, whose services were vital, was denied the right to extend his visa; he
was forced to leave. Third, government authorities interfered with the
joint venture's fishing rights. Fourth, harbor authorities refused to allow
ships dealing with the joint venture to use port facilities, and it became
very difficult to export. Finally, when the investor had been reduced to
flying out a single load of seafood per day on a small company plane, the
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c) The risk resulting from the repudiation of a contract by
the host government when the investor has no access to a
competent forum, faces unreasonable delays, or is unable to
enforce a final judgment.
d) The war and civil disturbance risk.
Schemes for the coverage of such risks may be national, bilateral,
regional or multilateral in concept and scope. While the bilateral
schemes have become well-established since the 1950s, and a regional
insurance agency was established in the 1970s, 3 only in 1988 did we
witness an operational multilateral insurance agency. Early initiatives
to create such an international investment guarantee entity emerged in
the 1950s, and the idea was discussed in the early 1960s in various
international forums including the World Bank, the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development, the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment, and the European Economic Community. However, none of
these earlier initiatives materialized. In the 1980s, the concept was re-
introduced in the form of the Convention Establishing the Multilateral
Investment Guarantee Agency ("MIGA"), which became effective in
April 1988.14
Since MIGA has just become operational, the main emphasis in
this article will be with the bilateral schemes,15 even though in the ap-
government refused to permit the joint venture to fly its plane unless it
was accompanied by a government-approved pilot and 'seafood inspector'.
This extra passenger ... weighed approximately 400 pounds and, appar-
ently, had been selected because he was the heaviest member of the armed
forces. Moreover, as a 'pilot,' he had a record of having crashed several
airplanes.
Shanks, Insuring Investment and Loans Against Currency Inconvertibility, Expropri-
ation, and Political Violence, 9 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 417, 425-26
(1986).
13. This is the Inter-Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation based in Kuwait.
Its operations are limited to investments made by Arab investors in Arab member coun-
tries of the Corporation. See Shihata, Arab Investment Guarantee Corporation: A Re-
gional Investment Insurance Project, 6 J. WORLD TRADE L. 185 (1972).
14. 24 I.L.M. 1598. For the background and operational structure of MIGA, see
Shihata, The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, 20 INT'L LAW. 485 (1986)
[hereinafter INT'L LAW.]; Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment
Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA, 1 ICSID REV.: FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J.
1 [hereinafter ICSID REV.]. See generally, Voss, supra note 2; SHIHATA, MIGA AND
FOREIGN INVESTMENT (1988).
15. Considerable intellectual interest in bilateral insurance schemes has already
been shown. See T. MERON, INVESTMENT INSURANCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1976); Adams, The Emerging Law of Dispute Settlement Under the United States
Investment Insurance Program, 3 L. & POLICY INT'L Bus. 101 (1971); Koven, Ex-
propriation and the Jurisprudence of OPIC, 22 HARV. INT'L L. J., 269 (1981); Note,
Encouraging Investment in LDCs: The United States Investment Guarantee Program,
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propriate areas of the discussion, comparisons with and references to
the MIGA scheme as represented in its Convention are made.
3. GENERAL FORM AND CONTENT OF GUARANTEE AGREEMENTS
The international agreements embodying these arrangements are
usually not as formal as other protective schemes such as investment
protection treaties. In fact, the bilateral guarantee agreements entered
into with capital importing countries by the United States and Canada
normally take the form of exchange of notes. The titles of some of the
agreements can be rather misleading; they may bear the same name as
a typical investment protection treaty, and yet deal with only invest-
ment insurance, or cover both protection and insurance. In every case,
one would have to examine the particular agreement further in order to
discover its objective and coverage. On the other hand, the multilateral
arrangement, MIGA, has been established primarily as an investment
insurance scheme through the medium of a convention, which is one of
the most formal modes of international agreements. But while MIGA
does not deal with investment protection in the traditional sense, it goes
beyond investment insurance and it has been assigned consultative and
advisory roles, all aimed at stimulating investment flows to and among
its developing member countries.
Several common elements exist under treaties dealing with invest-
ment insurance. Included among the relevant treaty provisions are sec-
tions covering required approval of the participating governments and
parties, limits on the types of insured investments, standards of com-
pensation in the event of expropriation, recourse provisions defining the
forum for dispute resolution, provisions regarding consultation upon re-
quest of either party, limits on the scope of protection, and explanations
of subrogation procedures. These and other relevant issues are analyzed
in the sections below. It will be observed that investor countries do not
use the same substantive agreements for all investee states and that in
some cases there are notable, though not fundamental, variations.
3.1. Eligible Investors
The first step in the analysis of investment insurance schemes is
the determination of eligible investors for purposes of a particular in-
vestment insurance agreement. The treaties generally specify those in-
dividuals or groups that constitute eligible investors and consequently
receive the protection afforded by the agreements. As a general rule,
8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 365 (1982);
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investment guarantee insurance is available only to nationals of the
contracting parties; nationals often include corporate bodies, individu-
als, and all other legal persons18
For example, in the France-Haiti Agreement of 1973"7 and the
France-Indonesia Agreement of 1973,1 investment guarantees are lim-
ited and available only to French nationals. The agreements are bilat-
eral in form but unilateral in scope. Not surprisingly, the France-Ko-
rea Agreement of 197519 contains nearly identical language as the other
two agreements regarding investor eligibility. Various United States
agreements treat the issue of investor eligibility somewhat differently
from the French agreements noted above. The United States-Nigeria
Agreement of 1974, for example, does not expressly state who are eligi-
ble investors. Rather, it speaks in terms of investments in projects in
Nigeria which are proposed by citizens of the United States of
America.2" It is clear, however, that the scope of beneficiaries is again
one-sided.
The United States-Yemen Arab Republic Agreement of 19722" is
another example of a bilateral agreement which only provides unilat-
eral investment insurance. Here the investment is expected to occur pri-
marily, if not exclusively, in Yemen. The insurance issuing government
is defined as the United States, and the host government as the Yemen
Arab Republic.22 The agreement also refers to an investor's proposal to
invest in a project or activity within the Yemen Arab Republic.2" No
mention is made of investments in the United States. Thus, only U.S.
investors investing in Yemen could obtain coverage under the agree-
ment. Three other American sponsored treaties are also written in the
same unilateral vein: United States-Oman, 1976;24 United States-Fiji,
16. Note, however, that disputes could easily arise as to the actual nationality of
such legal persons.
17. Convention on the Protection of Investment, July 2, 1973, France-Haiti, art.
I, 939 U.N.T.S. 299, 302 [hereinafter France-Haiti Agreement].
18. Agreement on the Encouragement and Protection of French Investments in
Indonesia, June 14, 1973, France-Indonesia, art. II, 985 U.N.T.S. 253, 258 [hereinaf-
ter France-Indonesia Agreement].
19. Convention on the Encouragement and Protection of French Investments in
the Republic of Korea, Jan. 22, 1975, France-Korea, art. I, 971 U.N.T.S. 385, 397
[hereinafter France-Korea Agreement].
20. Investment Guarantee Agreement, Aug. 3, 1974, United States-Nigeria, art.
1, 26 U.S.T. 102, 103, T.I.A.S. No. 8012 [hereinafter United States-Nigeria
Agreement].
21. Agreement on Investment Guaranties, Oct. 22-Dec. 4, 1972, United States-
Yemen, 24 U.S.T. 845, T.I.A.S. No. 7586 [hereinafter United States-Yemen
Agreement].
22. Id., art. 1.
23. Id.
24. Agreement on Investment Guaranties, Sept. 9, 1976, United States-Oman,
19881
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1976;25 United States-St. Vincent, 1972.26 The United States-China
Agreement of 1980 initially anticipated only investments by U.S. citi-
zens in China.27 It further provides for reciprocal treatment of invest-
ments between the two countries through a future exchange of notes,
which would require authorizing legislation in the United States.2"
Other major capital exporting countries also offer guarantees ex-
clusively to their nationals. The Canada-Israel 29 and Canada-Ja-
maica 0 Agreements refer to the promotion of investments in other
countries by Canadian nationals through the Canadian governmental
facility of the Export Development Corporation.
Another aspect of the category of eligible investors is found in the
France-Yugoslavia Agreement of 1975. Only French nationals, both in-
dividuals and corporate bodies, are eligible for investment guarantees.
These investors, however, must have obtained a bank guarantee ensur-
ing the free and expeditious transfer of proceeds from the possible liq-
uidation of their investments to be considered eligible."1 Thus, in defin-
ing eligible investors, this agreement also speaks to the issue of
protecting the investments in the host country. The France-Egypt
Agreement of 1976 appears more bilateral in design than the other
treaties discussed in this subsection. 32 Nationals or companies of either
party are eligible for investment guarantees in the territory of the other
28 U.S.T. 5670, T.I.A.S. No. 8651 [hereinafter United States-Oman Agreement].
25. Agreement on Investment Guaranties, Dec. 30, 1975-Jan. 9, 1976, United
States-Fiji, 27 U.S.T. 1826, T.I.A.S. No. 8281 [hereinafter United States-Fiji
Agreement].
26. Agreement on Investment Guaranties, May 15-June 14, 1972, United
States-St. Vincent, 29 U.S.T. 3802, T.I.A.S. No. 7530 [hereinafter United States-St.
Vincent Agreement].
27. Agreement on Investment Guaranties, Oct. 30, 1980, United States-People's
Republic of China, art. 1, 32 U.S.T. 4010, 4011, T.I.A.S. No. 9924 [hereinafter
United States-China Agreement].
28. Id., art. 7.
29. Agreement on Canadian Investments in Israel, May 1, 1972, Canada-Israel,
863 U.N.T.S. 113 [hereinafter Canada-Israel Agreement].
30. Agreement on Canadian Investments in Jamaica, Nov. 2, 1971, Canada-Ja-
maica, intro., 977 U.N.T.S., 197, 198 (agreement defines a Canadian corporation to
include subsidiaries not based in Canada or otherwise non-Canadian) [hereinafter Ca-
nada-Jamaica Agreement]; see generally Agreement on Canadian Investments in Libe-
ria, Nov. 24, 1972, Canada-Liberia, art. 1, 977 U.N.T.S. 289, 290 [hereinafter Ca-
nada-Liberia Agreement]; Agreement on Canadian Investment in Morocco, Mar. 12,
1974, Canada-Morocco, 978 U.N.T.S. 101 [hereinafter Canada-Morocco Agreement];
Agreement on Foreign Investment Insurance, Mar. 16, 1973, Canada-Indonesia, 977
U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Canada-Indonesia Agreement]. These agreements were es-
tablished by Canada on behalf of its investors.
31. Convention on the Protection of Investments, Mar. 28, 1974, France-Yugo-
slavia, arts. 1-6, 974 U.N.T.S. 107, 110 [hereinafter France-Yugoslavia Agreement].
32. Convention on the Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments, Dec.
22, 1974, Egypt-France, 996 U.N.T.S. 381.
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party33 insofar as the regulations of one Contracting Party provide for
guaranteeing external investments. 4 The result of the agreement is that
bilateral investment in both directions is anticipated and that restric-
tions regarding eligible investors exist only to the extent of applicable
investor country legislation.
The United States-Mauritius Agreement of 1970 also illustrates
the limitation that only citizens of an investor country are eligible for
investment guarantees."6 By contrast, the United States-Saudi Arabia
Agreement of 1975 declares that all persons eligible under applicable
United States legislation may be issued guarantees by the United States
Government. 6 Such language implies that non-United States nationals
may be eligible for guarantees if United States legislation so allows.
Still, the thrust of most bilateral agreements on this issue is clear; na-
tionality or citizenship is the focal point of eligibility, and the national-
ity in question is that of the capital-exporting country.
Under the multilateral arrangement, an investor, in order to qual-
ify for MIGA guarantee, must be a national of a member country of
the organization or, in the case of a corporate investor, either be incor-
porated and have its principal place of business in a member country or
have the majority of its capital owned by nationals of member coun-
tries.37 One distinguishing element of MIGA is that insurance eligibil-
ity could cover the nationals of capital exporting countries as well as
nationals of the host state if they transferred the assets to be invested
from outside the host country. This provision is intended to assist
member countries in attracting flight capital back to their countries.
3.2. Eligible Investments
Among the relevant provisions of investment insurance treaties are
sections requiring agreement on the nature of the project or investment
being insured. The United States-Syria Agreement of 1975 limits ap-
plication of the agreement procedures to those investments relating to
projects or activities approved by the Government of Syria. Regarding
construction or service contracts entered into with the Government of
33. Id., art. 1.
34. Id., art. 8.
35. Agreement on Investment Guaranties, May 11, 1970, United States-Mauri-
tius, art. 1, 21 U.S.T. 1172, 1177, T.I.A.S. No. 6875 [hereinafter United States-Mau-
ritius Agreement].
36. Agreement on Investment Guaranties, Feb. 27, 1975, United States-Saudi
Arabia, art. 1, 26 U.S.T. 459, 460, T.I.A.S. No. 8045 [hereinafter United States-Saudi
Arabia Agreement].
37. MIGA Convention, supra note 10, art. 13(a).
38. Id., art. 13(c).
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Syria itself, or any of its agencies or political subdivisions, the project or
activity is ipso facto considered to have Syrian governmental approval
for purposes of the agreement. 9 In the case of the United States-Fiji
Agreement of 1976, government approval is also presumed where the
Fiji government, or any agency or political subdivision of it, partici-
pates in the project.4" Thus, a preliminary caveat for prospective inves-
tors under this and numerous similar agreements is to obtain the ap-
proval, actual or presumptive, of the government in question.4'
Host government approval takes various forms. In the United
States-China Agreement, project approval by the government's Foreign
Investment Commission constitutes complete government approval. 42
Chinese government approval is also accomplished by obtaining ap-
proval of the Administrative Commissions for Special Economic Zones
of the concerned provinces. Like the United States-Syria Agreement of
1975,43 the Canada-Malaysia Agreement of 1975 also requires govern-
ment approval of the project in question.44 Adopting statute of frauds
principles, the Canada-Singapore Agreement of 1975, 41 the France-Ko-
rea Agreement of 1975,46 and the France-Indonesia Agreement of
197347 expressly require that host government approval be in writing.
The United States-Saudi Arabia Agreement of 1975 also requires
host government approval; however, only investments in Saudi Arabia,
the host country, are eligible for investment insurance .4  Four contem-
poraneously signed treaties to which the United States is a party -
39. Agreement on Investment Guaranties, Aug. 9, 1976, United States-Syria, art.
3, 28 U.S.T. 7122, 7124, T.I.A.S. No. 8707 [hereinafter United States-Syria
Agreement].
40. United States-Fiji Agreement, supra note 25, art. 2.
41. Host government approval is not uncommon or limited to the illustrated in-
stances. See United States-Yemen Agreement, supra note 21, para. 2, at 845; United
States-Oman Agreement, supra note 24, para. 2, at 5670 (contains language which
restricts application of the agreement procedures to coverage of investments in projects
or activities approved by the host government); see also United States-St. Vincent
Agreement, supra note 26, para. 2, at 3802 (which limits the application of agreement
procedures to guaranteed investments in projects or activities approved by the govern-
ment); Agreement on Investment Guaranties, Jan. 18, 1973, United States-Yugoslavia,
24 U.S.T. 1091, T.I.A.S. No. 7630 [hereinafter United States-Yugoslavia Agreement]
(applies agreement procedures to projects or activities duly registered in accordance
with applicable host government legislation).
42. United States-China Agreement, supra note 25, art. 2.
43. United States-Syria Agreement, supra note 39, art. 2.
44. Agreement on Canadian Investments in Malaysia, July 30-Oct. 1, 1971, Ca-
nada-Malaysia, art. 7, 976 U.N.T.S. 375, 379.
45. Agreement Relating to Canadian Investments in Singapore, July 26-July 30,
1971, Canada-Singapore, art. 6, 977 U.N.T.S. 135.
46. France-Korea Agreement, supra note 19, art. 1.
47. France-Indonesia Agreement, supra note 18, arts. 2 & 3.
48. United States-Saudi Arabia Agreement, supra note 36, art. 1.
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agreements with Bangladesh,49 Nigeria,50 Papua New Guinea, 5' and
Mauritius52 - contain common elements, one of which is the usual
host government approval. Other elements include the requirement that
upon the request of either of the contracting parties, the parties must
hold consultations with respect to the nature of the project or activity.
The United States-Mauritius Agreement stipulates that the consulta-
tion must be with regard to the nature of the proposed project or activ-
ity and its contribution to economic and social development in
Mauritius. 3
Similarly, the United States-Yugoslavia Agreement provides for
this type of consultation upon request of either party but is silent on
the condition concerning the project's contribution to the host country's
economic and social development."" The United States-Romania Agree-
ment makes a distinction in its approval provisions and consultation
requirements between approval for investments in a joint venture,
where coverage may be issued on the assumption that approval has
been granted, and other forms of investments, where express approval
is required. 5
Under the Belgium-Indonesia Agreement, the approved condition
is handled in one of two ways. Where the investment is in Indonesia,
protection is afforded only to investments with express Indonesian gov-
ernment approval. Where, on the other hand, the investment is in
Belgium, protection is available provided the investment was made con-
sistent with the relevant Belgian laws and regulations.5 6 Two points
emerge from this provision. First, the agreement expressly anticipates a
bilateral flow of investments between the contracting states. Second, the
Belgian approval arrangement reflects the general situation in most
Western capital exporting countries where there is no need for a for-
eign investor to obtain prior central government approval before doing
49. Investment Guarantees, Jan. 17-Jan. 20, 1975, United States-Bangladesh,
para. 1, 29 U.S.T. 4951, T.I.A.S. No. 9089, [hereinafter United States-Bangladesh
Agreement].
50. United States-Nigeria Agreement, supra note 20, para. 1.
51. Investment Guarantees, Nov. 28, 1977-Apr. 4, 1978, United States-Papua
New Guinea, paras. 1 & 2, 29 U.S.T. 3190, T.I.A.S. No. 9004 [hereinafter United
States-Papua New Guinea Agreement].
52. United States-Mauritius Agreement, supra note 35, art. 1.
53. For similar treaties containing an economic and social consideration clause,
see United States-Fiji Agreement, supra note 25, para. 1; United States-St. Vincent
Agreement, supra note 26, para. 1.
54. United States-Yugoslavia Agreement, supra note 41, para. 1.
55. Investment Guarantees, Apr. 28, 1973, United States-Romania, paras. 1 &
2, 24 U.S.T. 1073, T.I.A.S. No. 7627 [hereinafter United States-Romania Agreement].
56. Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments,
Jan. 15, 1970, Belgium-Indonesia, art. 9, paras. a & b, 843 U.N.T.S. 19.
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business. Registration of the requisite business organization with the
appropriate government agencies (e.g., registrar of companies, tax au-
thorities, etc.) are normally deemed adequate.
As with the bilateral arrangements, the investment eligibility re-
quirements under MIGA will initially include equity investments and
equity-type loans (i.e., loans and loan guarantees by equity holders in
the investment project with maturities of three years or more). How-
ever, unlike most bilateral schemes, MIGA will also extend coverage to
non-equity forms of direct investment (i.e., contractual arrangements
falling between traditional investments and export credits, such as pro-
duction-sharing, profit-sharing, management and turn-key contracts, as
well as franchising, licensing, and operating leasing agreements).
Moreover, MIGA's Board of Directors is authorized to extend coverage
to additional forms of direct investment."7
Thus, a third important issue in the investment insurance area is
the scope of protection provided to investors. What risks are covered by
the agreement and what risks are specifically excluded from coverage?
Is payment for losses conditional on the fulfillment of certain prerequi-
sites? Who ultimately pays for losses covered under the agreement?
3.3. Scope of Protection
Assuming that the investor and the investment are eligible for pro-
tection pursuant to specific treaty provisions, the next steps are to iden-
tify the insurance agency and evaluate the scope of protection, i.e., the
range of risks for which coverage can be obtained.
Generally, in the case of the bilateral schemes, an agency of the
government of the investor country provides the insurance coverage. In
the case of Canada, the insuring agency is a government agency called
the Export Development Corporation. This body is intended to pro-
mote investments in other countries by Canadian nationals by providing
protection against specific risks. The Canada-Trinidad and Tobago
Agreement of 1974 lists the specific risks entitled to protection: war,
riot, insurrection, revolution or rebellion; expropriation, confiscation or
deprivation of any property right by a government or any agency
thereof and inconvertibility of foreign exchange.58 This particular
agreement, like others, appears to limit insurance protection to the spe-
cific risks listed. 9
57. MIGA Convention, supra note 10, art. 12.
58. Exchange of Notes Relating to Canadian Investments in Trinidad and To-
bago, Feb. 8, 1974, Canada-Trinidad and Tobago, intro., para. 2, 977 U.N.T.S. 29.
59. The Canada-Israel Agreement, supra note 29, intro., para. 2, and the Ca-
nada-Jamaica Agreement, supra note 30, intro., para. 2, provide coverage for similar
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In contrast, the Canada-Indonesia Agreement 0 appears to contain
a more expansive list of risks. The insuring agency offers protection
against any action by the Government of Indonesia which prohibits or
restricts transfer of money to a Canadian investor (if he is entitled to
the money according to the laws and regulations of Indonesia), against
nationalization and revocation of ownership rights of Canadian inves-
tors, against restrictions of the rights of control or management of in-
vestments by the Government of Indonesia; and against war, riot, in-
surrection, revolution or rebellion in Indonesia. Yet in another sense,
the agreement is quite restrictive. First, it contemplates the right of In-
donesia to limit its liability in certain circumstances. Second, in deter-
mining whether an investor is entitled to remuneration for currency
losses, Indonesian laws and regulations prevail. Hence, questions exist
as to when, under what circumstances, and to what extent Indonesia
can limit its liability.61
In terms of specific risks covered by particular agreements, the
United States-China Agreements2 is somewhat exceptional. Losses from
political risks are generally eligible for investment insurance. However,
according to an interpretation letter from the U.S. Overseas Private In-
vestment Corporation's ("OPIC") General Counsel issued prior to the
conclusion of the incentive agreement with China, the scope of protec-
tion of this agreement does not cover losses resulting from war, revolu-
tion, and insurrection." One can only guess the reason for this exclu-
sion: that China, from the standpoint of the U.S. Government, had
been known to be too prone to cultural and other forms of revolution in
addition to border wars since the 1960s. But if that is the case, this
would be the very reason why a prospective investor in China would
seek investment insurance against such types of political risks.
A final issue concerning the scope of protection under these agree-
ments is addressed in the United States-Nigeria Agreement. Under that
agreement, the United States must notify and consult the Nigerian
risks: war, riot, insurrection, revolution, rebellion, expropriation, etc. They also declare
that protection is offered by the insuring government against risks which are effected or
triggered by government or government agency action. The loss need not occur through
the fault of one of the contracting governments; only that a government or agency
thereof be responsible for the loss-creating event. Id.
60. Canada-Indonesia Agreement, supra note 30, art. 1.
61. The Canada-Morocco Agreement, supra note 30, and the Canada-Liberia
Agreement, supra note 30, employ language similar to the Canada-Indonesia Agree-
ment, supra note 30.
62. United States-China Agreement, supra note 27, art. 1.
63. Letter from Paul R. Gilbert, OPIC Vice President and General Counsel, to
Chen Shuzhi, Vice President of Chinese Int'l Trust & Investment Corp., Oct. 7, 1980,
19 I.L.M. 1490 (interpreting art. 1 of the United States-China Investment Incentive
Agreement).
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Government before the former pays any person under the guarantee
agreement.6 4
Under the MIGA Convention the covered risks are basically those
referred to in Section 2 of this article discussing the concept of invest-
ment guarantee (i.e., the currency transfer risk, the expropriation risk,
the contract repudiation risk, and the war and civil disturbance risk).6"
In addition to these types of risks, coverage may be extended to other
non-commercial risks such as acts of terrorists directed at the investor,
kidnapping or politically motivated strikes in the future.6
3.4. Rights of Insuring Agency Against Investee State: Subrogation
Of all the provisions included in investment insurance treaties,
those defining the rights of the insuring agency against the investee
(host) state are the most essential. It should be noted that even though
insurance or guarantee agreements ensure the subrogation of the inves-
tor's rights to the insurer government or agency, these agreements
themselves do not spell out these rights of the investor which constitute
the subject-matter of the subrogation. Rather, these rights are dealt
with elsewhere under bilateral investment protection treaties, muti-
lateral conventions, general principles of international law, the national
investment codes, investment-related legislation, and constitutions of the
host states, etc. It is to these documents that one should look for the
rights of the individual and not to the guarantee agreements. Subroga-
tion does nothing more than assign an existing claim from the investor
to the insurer agency. On the other hand, these agreements do spell out
the rights of the investor vis-a-vis the insurer agency.
As with the other issues of investor and investment eligibility and
scope of protection covered by the bilateral treaties, the provisions on
subrogation display common elements in the various agreements stud-
ied. These agreements establish the so-called subrogation rights of the
insuring agency against the host state. Thus, the France-Haiti Agree-
ment employs language to the effect that if the French State (the in-
surer) makes payment to any investor under its coverage, it shall auto-
matically succeed to the rights of such investor with regard to the
Haitian Government. 7 The France-Yugoslavia Agreement has lan-
guage identical to the France-Haiti Agreement on the matter of
64. United States-Nigeria Agreement, supra note 20, art. 3. The general scheme
for processing and paying out claims to aggrieved investors is discussed in Section C of
this report.
65. MIGA Convention, supra note 10, art. 11(a).
66. Voss, supra note 2, at 10.
67. France-Haiti Agreement, supra note 17, art. 4.
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subrogation.68
The subrogation provisions of the United States-Syria Agree-
ment69 and the United States-Fiji Agreement 0 are also identical. Like-
wise, the France-Tunisia Agreement provides that the insuring state
automatically succeeds to the rights of the nationals or beneficiaries.
However, it adds that such payments under these conditions shall not
affect the rights of the guaranteed beneficiary to have recourse to the
ICSID or to continue actions brought before it until the outcome of the
proceeding has been determined. 1
A second element found in some of the agreements is the delega-
tion of subrogation rights to a national insuring agency by the insuring
state or contracting party. Thus, the United States-Saudi Arabia Agree-
ment provides that where OPIC, or a similar public agency of the U.S.
Government, makes payment pursuant to an investment guarantee or
received assignments, such agency shall be recognized as succeeding to
the rights of the guaranteed person or firm.72 Similarly, three Canadian
sponsored agreements state that when the Export Development Corpo-
ration makes payment pursuant to the agreements' provisions, the host
government shall allow the corporation to exercise the rights it acquires
by law or those assigned to it.
1 3
There is a dual process involved in most provisions dealing with
subrogation. The China-Sweden Agreement demonstrates this point.
First, when a contracting state or delegated agency makes payment to
an investor under an investment guarantee in the other contracting
state, the host contracting state shall initially recognize the transfer by
the investor to the insuring contracting state, of any currency, credits,
assets or investments for which payment was made under the coverage
(e.g., blocked dividends, compensation in soft local currency, physical
assets damaged during civil war or strife). Second, the host contracting
state must also recognize the subrogation of the other contracting state
to any related right, title, claim, privilege, or cause of action that the
investor may have against the host state. 4 In other words, "transfer"
describes the recognition of an investor-home state arrangement;
68. France-Yugoslavia Agreement, supra note 31, art. 4; see also identical lan-
guage in the France-Indonesia Agreement, supra note 18, art. 5.
69. United States-Syria Agreement, supra note 39, art. 3, paras. A, B & C.
70. United States-Fiji Agreement, supra note 27, art. 3.
71. Convention on Protection of Investments, Nov. 22, 1972, France-Tunisia,
art. 3, 848 U.N.T.S. 141.
72. United States-Saudi Arabia Agreement, supra note 36, art. 2.
73. Canada-Morocco Agreement, supra note 30, art. 1; Canada-Indonesia
Agreement, supra note 30, art. 1; Canada-Liberia Agreement, supra note 30, art. 1.
74. Agreement on the Mutual Protection of Investments, Mar. 29, 1982, Peo-
ple's Republic of China-Sweden, art. 5, 21 I.L.M. 477.
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whereas "subrogation" properly relates to rights accruing from the in-
vestor-host state entanglement.
Under the China-Sweden Agreement, the subrogation of the in-
suring government to the rights of the insured beneficiary is expressly
made subject to the deduction of the investor's debts to the host con-
tracting state. The United States-China Agreement is similar in this
respect. The United States-Romania Agreement is even more explicit:
the issuing government as a successor in interest to the rights of the
investor is liable for the payment of legal taxes and the fulfillment of
all other contractual obligations of the erstwhile investor. 5 Hence,
rather than leaving for inference the fact that the successor in interest
naturally assumes the investor's rights subject to all valid claims, these
agreements specify taxes and contractual obligations as preconditions to
the exercise of subrogation.
There are several additional elements which are worthy of note in
the subrogation arrangements. First, there is the "third or other entity"
proviso. Where the laws of the host state prohibit the insuring agency
(e.g., the Canadian Export Development Corporation) from acquiring
any property in that state, the host government may be requested to
permit the agency to transfer the property to an entity permitted to
own such property.76 However, while some agreements mention "pro-
hibition" from acquisition of property, others refer to the "invalida-
tion" of such acquisition.
Thus, the United States-Mauritius Agreement provides that the
host government shall permit the issuing government to transfer the
property to an entity permitted to own it if the laws of the host govern-
ment invalidate the acquisition of any property by the issuing govern-
ment.17 This seemingly slight difference between prohibition and inval-
idation might be interpreted to mean that the latter language authorizes
or empowers the host government to invalidate post facto such property
acquired by subrogation (e.g., on grounds that some legal rule or proce-
dure was not followed in the course of the acquisition); whereas the
language of prohibition covers the situation where there is a pre-ex-
isting general law preventing the foreign state's acquisition of such
property under those circumstances (e.g., under the investment code,
exchange control laws, or national security provisions). The United
75. United States-Romania Agreement, supra note 55, art. 3.
76. United States-Papua New Guinea Agreement, supra note 51, art. 4 ("invali-
date or prohibit"); see also United States-Bangladesh Agreement, supra note 49, art. 4
("invalidate or prohibit").
77. United States-Mauritius Agreement, supra note 35, art. 4; see also Canada-
Morocco Agreement, supra note 30, art. 2; Canada-Indonesia Agreement, supra note
30, art. 2; Canada-Liberia Agreement, supra note 30, art. 2.
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States-Nigeria Agreement includes a further requirement that the U.S.
government, when it is subrogated to any assets, shall give the Nigerian
federal government the first option to purchase the assets at a mutually
negotiated price. 8
Second, some treaties provide that the government of the insuring
agency reserves its rights to assert a claim under international law if
there is a denial of justice or some question of state responsibility in
international law.1 9 Such claims are made by the issuing government in
its sovereign capacity and may be called "sovereign capacity claims."
Third, the issue of currency treatment deserves mention. Some
treaties require that the currency of the host government acquired by
the insuring agency under investment insurance contracts should be
treated in the same way by the host country as if the funds had re-
mained with the investor.8" Alternatively, under other agreements,
treatment of acquired currency is to be no less favorable than the funds
of private investors in similar investment activities.81 The idea is to
make such currency transferrable under the applicable exchange con-
trol laws.
Regarding currency treatment, some treaties state that funds shall
be freely available to the government of the insuring agency to meet its
expenses in the host state,82 which could include diplomatic mission ex-
penses as well as other financial commitments of the insurer state in the
host country. After a claim is ripe and there has been no payment for
the time prescribed in the insurance policy, the insurance agency hypo-
thetically may buy the local currency for dollars at the prevailing rate
and sell it to its embassy for the latter's local operating expenses. The
embassy then credits the agency's account. However, this scheme is of
little help when diplomatic relations have been severed between the
host and home countries concerned or when the embassy is already del-
uged in local currency and is unable to spend it quickly enough. In
such cases, the agency might arrange for swaps with other governments
or commercial entities.83
A final noteworthy aspect of subrogation rights concerns the limi-
78. United States-Nigeria Agreement, supra note 20, art. 3, point 3.
79. Canada-Morocco Agreement, supra note 30, art. 3; Canada-Indonesia
Agreement, supra note 30, art. 3; Canada-Liberia Agreement, supra note 30, art. 3.
80. Canada-Morocco Agreement, supra note 30, art. 4; Canada-Indonesia
Agreement, supra note 30, art. 4; Canada-Liberia Agreement, supra note 30, art. 4.
81. United States-Nigeria Agreement, supra note 20, art. 4; see also Agreement
for Promotion and Protection of Investments, Dec. 3, 1980, Philippines-United King-
dom, art. 8, 20 I.L.M. 326.
82. Canada-Morocco Agreement, supra note 30, art. 4; Canada-Indonesia
Agreement, supra note 30, art. 4; Canada-Liberia Agreement, supra note 30, art. 4.
83. See Shanks, supra note 12, at 426-27.
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tation on the rights of the insuring agency (or the government, as the
case may be). Some treaties declare that the insuring agency shall assert
no greater rights than those of the transferring investor. Further, the
United States-Oman Agreement expressly states that the successor gov-
ernment shall be subject to legal defenses assertable against the trans-
ferring investor to the same extent as a transferree that is a private
entity. 4 Thus, the issuing government may well have limited recourse
against the host government.
The four elements of subrogation rights discussed herein - "other
entity" clauses, sovereign capacity claims, currency treatment, and limi-
tations on the rights of the successor in interest - are found in numer-
ous other investment insurance agreements.
On the multilateral level, the MIGA Convention also affirms the
subrogation principle. Upon payment of a claim to the investor, MIGA
becomes subrogated to the investor's rights against the host country or
third party obligors.8" Since insured investors will not be parties to the
Convention, MIGA's subrogation will be based on covenants to this
effect in the contracts of guarantee between MIGA and the investors.
By virtue of article 18(b) of the Convention, the host country and all
other member countries will recognize MIGA's subrogation without
the need for any further agreement.8 6
4. NATIONAL AGENCY SCHEMES FOR ADMINISTRATION OF GUAR-
ANTEE AGREEMENTS: OPIC AS A MODEL
The bilateral investment insurance or guarantee agreements ana-
lyzed so far provide little more than an umbrella for the operational
aspects of international investment insurance. These agreements do not
deal with the establishment of bilateral investment guarantee agencies.
Hence, although the insurance protection provisions embodied in these
documents are bilateral or intergovernmental in form and conception,
their actual implementation falls into the domestic domain of one or
both of the contracting states.
Thus, various capital exporting countries, including the United
States, Canada, Japan, Great Britain, and West Germany, have estab-
lished national guarantee or insurance agencies, which operate under
their own statutes and regulations, with or without the appendage of
bilateral investment insurance agreements. Even though the subject
matter of this article is international, a fuller understanding of bilateral
84. United States-Oman Agreement, supra note 24, para. 3.
85. MIGA Convention, supra note 10, art. 18(a).
86. Voss, supra note 2, at 15.
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insurance schemes demands some appreciation of the workings of na-
tional investment insurance agencies. For this analysis, the United
States Overseas Private Investment Corporation is our bilateral
paradigm.
8 7
4.1. Historical Background
OPIC is a corporate body and an independent agency of the U.S.
Government established by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969. Its ba-
sic mission is "[tlo mobilize and facilitate the participation of United
States private capital and skills in the economic and social development
of less developed friendly countries and areas ... ."88
The investment insurance program began in 1948 as part of the
European Recovery Program or Marshall Plan. It was first limited to
protection against currency inconvertibility. In the 1950s, there was a
change of focus directed to the less-developed countries. At the same
time, the program was also broadened to include insurance coverage for
revolution and insurrection, as well as loan guarantees and feasibility
study assistance. In 1961, the insurance program was transferred to the
newly-formed Agency for International Development ("AID"). OPIC
effectively took over the insurance program of AID in 1971.
4.2. Organization and Management
OPIC is governed by a joint public-private board of eleven direc-
tors. Six directors are from the private sector, and they are appointed
by the President of the United States subject to Senate confirmation.
The five government directors are the Administrator of AID, the Presi-
dent of OPIC, and the Undersecretaries or Assistant Secretaries from
the Departments of State, Treasury, and Commerce. By law, the pow-
ers of OPIC are vested in and exercised by or under authority of its
Board of Directors.89 OPIC has no overseas offices or staff, although it
receives support from the U.S. embassies and the AID mission staff.
Under section 2191 of Title 22 of the United States Code, OPIC "shall
be under the policy guidance of the Secretary of State." The agency has
an insurance program as well as a finance program.90
87. This section of the article is based on Hunt, The Overseas Private Invest-
ment Corporation, in INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 274 (2d ed. 1979);
pamphlets and other literature from OPIC on its programs and services; and Shanks,
supra note 12.
88. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1982). OPIC is located in Washington, D.C.
89. 22 U.S.C. § 2193(b) (1982).
90. "Under its finance program, OPIC can participate as a medium to long-term
project lender. For smaller projects, involving small business, OPIC can participate as a
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The Insurance Department of OPIC is administered by a Vice
President and organized into two groups. There is a Natural Resources
and Financial Services Division and an International Division, with
each division headed by a Managing Director. The International Divi-
sion is divided into two regional divisions. One division covers Europe,
the Near and Middle East, Southeast Asia and Africa, while the other
covers Latin America, the Caribbean, East Asia and South Asia. Insur-
ance officers handle insurance matters in their assigned countries or
areas of functional responsibility. The nature and financial structure of
OPIC precludes any determination of net worth. Insurance and guar-
antee obligations are paid out of separate reserve accounts maintained
in the Treasury of the United States, which are designated the Insur-
ance Reserve and Guarantee Reserve. The agency's operations have
been self-sustaining in recent years.
4.3. Basic Objectives and Policies
As already indicated, OPIC's function is to facilitate the contribu-
tion of U.S. private enterprise to the process of foreign economic devel-
opment. OPIC is required to be selective in its support of United States
investment in less-developed countries. In determining whether to sup-
port a project, OPIC is to be "especially . . . guided by the economic
and social development impact and benefits . . . and the ways such a
project complements, or is compatible with, other development assis-
tance programs or projects of the United States or other donors.""1
The Foreign Assistance Act further requires OPIC to consider
whether the foreign investments it is requested to underwrite might ad-
versely affect the U.S. economy. OPIC is also directed by law to give
"preferential consideration" to projects sponsored by small United
States businesses.92 The 1985 amendments to the OPIC legislation urge
the corporation to give preferential consideration to projects in countries
with per capita incomes of $896 or less (in 1983 U.S. dollars).93 Other
legislation also restricts OPIC's operations in higher income less-devel-
oped countries. There must be an agreement between the project coun-
try and the United States to institute a program for insurance guaran-
tees, or reinsurance, such as the typical intergovernmental investment
guarantee agreements analyzed in earlier sections of this article. Statu-
tory constraints on furnishing assistance to a particular country, such as
direct lenders. For larger projects, . . . [it] can facilitate commercial lending by provid-
ing investment guarantees for commercial bank loans." Shanks, supra note 12, at 422.
91. 22 U.S.C. § 2191(2) (1982).
92. 22 U.S.C. § 2191(1) (1982).
93. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2191(2) (West Supp. 1985).
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the Hickenlooper Amendment94 to the Foreign Assistance Act, may
limit OPIC operations.
4.4. Insurance Program
The political risks covered are specified in the Foreign Assistance
Act. They include: unanticipated inability to convert into dollars other
currency received by the investor as earnings or profits or return on
investment; loss of investment, in whole or in part, due to expropriation
or confiscation by action of a foreign government; loss due to war,
revolution, or insurrection; and loss due to business interruption result-
ing from the foregoing risks.95
4.4.1. Eligibility and Other Conditions
An eligible investor means:
(1) a United States citizen; (2) corporations, partnerships, or
other associations ... created under the laws of the United
States or of any state or territory thereof ... [which is] sub-
stantially beneficially owned by United States citizens [at
least 50 percent United States ownership]; . . . and (3) for-
eign corporations, partnerships or other associations wholly
owned by one or more such United States citizens, corpora-
tions, partnerships or other associationsY
To be eligible for OPIC insurance, the investment must be in a
new project, or a significant expansion, modernization, or development
of an existing enterprise.9 The investor should obtain adequate insur-
ance to cover possible project cost overruns, because a second applica-
tion for further capital contributions may be deemed ineligible as not
being a new project.98 In order for the investment to be insurable, it
must plan to remain in the foreign enterprise for at least three years.
94. The Hickenlooper Amendment, adopted in 1962 against the views of the
Kennedy Administration, seeks to deny the benefits of U.S. foreign aid to countries that
expropriate property owned by U.S. citizens without full and speedy compensation "as
required by international law." See § 301(3)(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 237(e)(1) (1982). The traditional formulation of this position
is that nationalization should be accompanied by prompt, adequate and effective com-
pensation. This concept is also known as the Hull Doctrine, first articulated in 1938 by
U.S. Secretary of State Cordell Hull in an exchange with the Mexican Minister of
Foreign Relations.
95. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2194(1) (West Supp. 1988).
96. 22 U.S.C. § 2198(c) (1982) (these considerations apply notwithstanding for-
eign ownership of up to five percent of the shares).
97. See Hunt, supra note 87, at 292.
98. See id.
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OPIC insurance coverage is available both for conventional equity in-
vestments and loans and for investment or exposure of funds, goods or
services under various contractual arrangements. For licensing of pat-
ents, processes, and techniques in exchange for royalty payments,
OPIC coverage is available for inconvertibility risk only. 9
"OPIC requires investors making application for insurance cover-
age to supply data on the project's effect on employment, development
of local skills, balance of payments, taxes, and other host government
revenues."' 00 From the domestic U.S. standpoint, no project will be as-
sisted if it involves a significant reduction in U.S. employment. As al-
ready noted, there are additional statutory prohibitions against OPIC
support for projects in certain countries and for certain types of
projects.
4.4.2. Application Procedure
The applicant must obtain an OPIC "Registration Letter" before
the investment has been irrevocably committed.'' The primary pur-
pose of this document is to establish the timeliness of the application.'0 2
A request for a Registration letter must contain the following
information:
(a) the identity of the investor,
(b) citizenship eligibility of the investor,
(c) the country or territory in which the investment is to be
made,
(d) a brief description of the project,
(e) a statement that the investment has not been made or
irrevocably committed, and
(f) the type of investment contemplated, the kind of insur-
ance coverages desired, and an estimate of the amounts
under each coverage.' 3
A registration fee must accompany the application.'0 The Registration
Letter does not constitute a promise to insure a project.'05
OPIC will do its own technical appraisal or evaluation of particu-
lar projects to ensure that it is attractive from the insurer's perspective.
99. Id. at 293.
100. Id. at 294.
101. Id. at 302.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 302-03.
104. Id. at 303.
105. Id. at 302.
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An underwriter or broker generally is involved at this level to help the
potential insured prepare the appropriate documents to satisfy the in-
surer's expectations. Special attention is given not only to the nature of
the project but also its financial and ownership structure, since the lat-
ter arrangements could be an incentive or disincentive to expropriation
depending on how they are structured.1"6
4.4.3. Project Approval and Collateral Agreements by Host
Government
It is the responsibility of the applicant to obtain the foreign gov-
ernment project approval ("FGA")."07 OPIC gives the applicant guid-
ance on obtaining the FGA when it issues the Registration Letter.1 0 8
The original signed copy of FGA is delivered by local authorities to the
U.S. Embassy for forwarding to OPIC.'0 9 The OPIC application re-
quires inclusion of statutes, decrees, or permits of special pertinence to
the project. The insured is under a continuing duty during the period
of the contract to disclose to OPIC all arrangements with the host gov-
ernment regarding investment remittances.110 Investors must agree not
to enter into any agreement requiring compensation for expropriation
without OPIC's prior written consent. 11'
4.4.4. Formal Application
The formal application for insurance coverage is filed when the
final form of the investment is reasonably clear."1 2 An insurance officer
may request clarification or additional data needed to complete a tenta-
tive form of insurance contract.11 3
106. Peter Gilbert cites the case of one medium-sized mine in Chile that escaped
the 1971 Chilean nationalization exercise largely because it had involved foreign banks
and international organizations in its debt and equity structure. He also notes that
involvement of a local partner with special expertise may be a disincentive to nationali-
zation, but not necessarily someone with a high degree of political exposure. Gilbert,
Acquiring and Utilizing Political Risk Insurance: A Practitioner's Perspective, 9
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 407, 409 (1986). MIGA is also expected to ap-
praise projects before underwriting them. The appraisal is to be done in terms of the
projects developmental merits (i.e., its economic viability), contribution to the host
country's development consistent with the host government's declared development
objectives and priorities and compliance with the host country's laws and regulations.
See MIGA Convention, supra note 10, art. 12(d)(i)-(iii).
107. Hunt, supra note 87, at 303.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 303-04.
112. Id. at 304.
113. Id.
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4.4.5. Limits of Guarantee and Cost of Coverage
Insurance coverage is limited to the dollar value at the time of
investment in the project plus accrued earnings, interest, or profits." 4
The insured must bear at least ten percent of the risk of loss on the
total investment in the project. OPIC insurance contracts generally re-
quire the insurance premium to be paid annually ahead of time." 5
In 1977 a new comprehensive premium rating structure was
adopted. Base rates for each coverage type were established for five dif-
ferent types of projects: manufacturing and services; natural resources;
hydrocarbons; institutional lenders; and service contractors. Base rates
can be adjusted up or down thirty-three percent depending on the risk
profile of a specific project.
Insurance cost is based on the nature of the investor's undertaking
and the project's risk profile, not on the country where the project is to
be located. The 1984 base rates were as follows:
Annual Base Rate Per
Coverage $100 of Coverage
Inconvertibility $.30
Expropriation .60
War, Revolution, Insurrection .60
Civil Strife Rider .15
Although these base rates are typical for most projects, cost is de-
termined by a project's risk profile."'
4.4.6. Contract Terms
The "General Terms and Conditions" of the contract forms used
by OPIC are standard and will be altered only to meet unusual circum-
stances. 17 The OPIC "Special Terms and Conditions of the Final
114. Id. at 301.
115. Id.
116. The details of determining the specific premium rates are set forth in Hunt,
supra note 87, at 344 (Exhibit 4). Compare this with the anticipated MIGA arrange-
ment. Investors will be offered a choice between coverage against individual types of
risk (currency transfer, expropriation, etc.) and coverage against a risk package com-
prising several or all of these types of package coverage, normally at a flat rate. Under
MIGA, premiums will be differentiated in accordance with actual risk-taking within a
range of 0.3 to 1.5% of the guaranteed amount per annum for each type of risk covered.
"Within this range, risks will be rated on a case-by-case basis rather than on the eco-
nomic and political stability of the host country. Investors purchasing coverage against
several types of risk will qualify for a package discount of up to 50% of the sum of the
rates for the types of coverage comprising the package." Voss, supra note 2, at 18.
117. Id. at 300.
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Contract of Insurance" contain a description of the investor, the invest-
ment, the project in which the investment is being made, and the secur-
ities evidencing the investment."' These Special Terms and Conditions,
together with the General Terms and Conditions, constitute the full
and final contract of insurance or insurance policy.
4.4.7. Investor's Claims Against Insuring Agency
The insurance obligations of OPIC can be met immediately
through its insurance reserves.119 Obligations are also backed by the
full faith and credit of the United States. s°
The insured is expected to take the following measures in order to
expedite the processing of its claim: give OPIC prompt notice of any
action or impending action by the investee state; work closely with
OPIC to help avoid losses in the first place; be aware that most expro-
priation coverage requires the expropriatory action to continue for a
year before an insurance claim can mature; attempt to avoid or mitigate
losses; keep OPIC fully informed of the progress of any compensation
negotiation with the investee states since, under the insurance contract,
OPIC requires its prior consent to agreements with the foreign govern-
ment on these matters; and carefully maintain and preserve accounting
data and maintain records outside the project country.
121
Most of these measures or procedures are aimed at securing the
subrogation rights of the insurer. As GiITert notes, insurers cannot tol-
erate the destruction or loss of their potential rights under subroga-
tion. 22 At this point, the insurer and the insured are expected to func-
tion as a partnership, aimed at maximizing the insurer's- "salvage"
potential after payment of the claim to the insured.' 2 As already noted,
a political risk insurance policy has a "waiting period" during which
the insured risk must continue in existence before a compensable loss is
deemed to have occurred. The waiting period could be days, months or
even years. The compensable loss does not arise immediately after the
occurrence of the event constituting the risk, as in fire or theft insur-
ance policies. During the waiting period, the insured is typically re-
quired to take reasonable steps to prevent loss and to preserve its reme-
dies. Moreover the insurer may want to use the waiting period to
attempt a negotiated settlement with the host country, either by itself or
118. Id.
119. Hunt, supra note 87, at 305.
120. Id.
121. See id. at 306.
122. See Gilbert, supra note 106, at 413.
123. Id.
19881
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
through an intermediary.
Claims of the insured against the host government pass to OPIC
under assignments required by the insurance contract. The intergovern-
mental guarantee agreements also set out the subrogation and succes-
sion rights of the United States Government. OPIC requires investors
to pursue local remedies before insurance compensation is payable.
Payment arrangements take more than one form. For example, OPIC
may settle a claim by paying compensation in cash to the investor while
accepting installments from the host government, by persuading the in-
vestor to accept host government commitments backed by OPIC guar-
antees, or by a combination of cash payments and guarantees."'
4.5. Criticism of OPIC
The above account of OPIC and its operational structure is neces-
sarily brief and insufficient as a basis for long-range conclusions. How-
ever, it should be observed that some commentators have questioned
whether OPIC, in spite of the letter of the law, does in practice favor
big business at the expense of small business, whether it really contrib-
utes to the economic development of investee states or if its primary
goal is to help U.S. businessmen, whether governmental insurance of
private investors increases the likelihood of conflict between the United
States and host countries by politicizing investment disputes, and
whether the concern of U.S. labor, namely, that OPIC operations con-
stitute a subsidy to U.S. business and encourage the flow of jobs over-
seas, is well-founded."' 5
Indeed, since 1985, critics of OPIC from opposing ends of the po-
litical spectrum have succeeded either in adding more restrictions on the
agency's operational freedom or in questioning its place within the U.S.
governmental framework. Thus in 1985, Congress adopted a provision
prohibiting OPIC from assisting investments in countries which are not
taking steps to adopt and implement "internationally recognized work-
ers' rights."12 In the wake of Union Carbide's investment tragedy in
Bhopal, India, Congress also added a provision requesting an environ-
124. Shihata, INT'L LAW., supra note 14, at 497.
125. See J. BARTON & B. FISHER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE & INVESTMENT
918-19 (1986); see also S. REP. No. 676, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4517. For divergent views, see Review of Activities of
the Overseas Private Investment Corp: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Economic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1980).
126. Overseas Private Investment Corporation Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2191(a) (West
Supp. 1988).
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mental impact statement on investments to be supported by OPIC."2'
At the same time, the Reagan Administration proposed in its 1987
Budget that OPIC be "privatized" by the end of 1988, a suggestion
which it has rejected on previous occasions. 2
5. EVALUATION OF BILATERAL SCHEMES AND THE RATIONALE FOR
MIGA
This article has discussed international investment insurance
agreements in terms of the main issues or topics with which they typi-
cally deal: eligible investors, eligible investments, the scope of protection
or coverage afforded to investors, and the rights of the insuring agency
against the investee state in the event of the occurrence of any of the
risks covered by the investment agreement. The provisions of the bilat-
eral agreements do not differ drastically from state to state or from one
geopolitical region of the world to another. The provisions are fairly
standard, even though there are interesting variations from time to
time.
On the question of eligible investors, it is clear that all of the bilat-
eral agreements analyzed restrict coverage to the nationals of the con-
tracting parties. No mention is made of another group of potential in-
vestors, namely, permanent residents in capital exporting countries.
The technical reason for this failure may be that since the latter are not
nationals or citizens of the capital exporting countries in which they are
residents, those countries cannot espouse the residents' claims under
general principles of international law or international agreements. In
any case, such agreements would presumably do nothing to prevent the
state of nationality of such permanent residents from espousing their
claim on their behalf. This could lead to a confusion of parties in
interest.
The agreements are also silent on the criteria for determining the
nationality of corporations (i.e., whether it is the country of incorpora-
tion or the country of effective management, or other criteria known in
private international law). Since countries differ in terms of the criteria
applicable in the determination of corporate nationality, it may be use-
ful either to articulate in these agreements which criterion is applicable,
or at least to decide which of the contracting parties has the right to
determine that issue. The issue would otherwise fail to be decided
under controversial principles of conflict of laws.
On the issue of eligible investments, the approval by the host state
127. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2199(a) (West Supp. 1988).
128. Shanks, supra note 12, at 436.
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is a standard condition of insurance eligibility. The variation among
countries and agreements consists of whether a particular country re-
quires a specific document of approval, or whether there can be "ap-
proval by implication." In the case of the United States-Romania
Agreement of 1973, host government participation in a joint venture is
deemed to constitute approval. Another example of such approval by
necessary implication would be the situation in which a government
agency such as an investment board or commission has granted fiscal
incentives to a foreign investment project. These matters are perhaps of
purely evidentiary interest. Except in the situations where one could
speak clearly of approval by necessary implication, such as the two ex-
amples just given, it might be in the best interest of the foreign investor
to insist on an actual document of approval. Also of interest to the for-
eign investor is the provision in the Canada-Liberia Agreement which
restricts coverage to investments that further the development of eco-
nomic relations between the two contracting parties. This raises issues
of economic independence and undermines the autonomy of the host
state in deciding which economic projects are in its best interest. The
MIGA Convention provides a refreshing contrast by focusing exclu-
sively on the developmental aspects of the projects in the appraisal pro-
cess. There is no attempt to combine the developmental aspects with the
economic interests of the capital exporting country, such as export pro-
motion and procurement of raw material.
Not all investment insurance agreements define the scope of cover-
age or risks covered by the anticipated insurance. Indeed, agreements to
which the United States is a party hardly define such a scope of protec-
tion and leave this issue to the domestic legislation of OPIC. Where
domestic legislation takes care of this definitional issue, it is prudent for
the bilateral investment agreement to remain silent on the point so as to
avoid possible inconsistencies in coverage. However, where the matter
is covered by both domestic legislation and the intergovernmental in-
strument, there is a need to show consistency in the relevant provisions.
It appears that the scope of coverage is not of as much interest to the
host state as to the home state, since it s the latter or its delegated
agency that actually pays out the insurance when particular events
occur.
One interesting provision found in the United States-Nigeria
Agreement is the requirement that the host state should be consulted by
the investor state before the latter makes any payments to its national
investor in the event that the risks contemplated -by the agreement actu-
ally are suffered. This provision, coupled with another clog on the sub-
rogation rights of the insuring agency against the investee state, puts
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the host state in a significantly strong bargaining position. This is the
provision to the effect that in the event that the U.S. government be-
comes subrogated to any assets of its national investors, the government
of Nigeria should be given the first option to purchase those assets.
A more general issue concerns the necessity of bilateral investment
agreements as a condition for issuing national insurance coverage. As
indicated in the introduction to this paper, such agreements are not
logically necessary for the operation of an insurance scheme. Private
insurance companies offer insurance without these agreements, and
governments themselves have been known to have instituted insurance
schemes without these types of umbrella investment agreements. The
main reason these agreements are on the rise appears to be the fact that
the capital exporting countries in particular require them as a condition
for granting insurance to their nationals. These agreements presumably
give those countries greater confidence in espousing the claims of their
nationals under international law, particularly claims based on specific
international agreements rather than on customary principles. In any
case, most of these investment agreements are only bilateral in form
and serve essentially as vehicles for the governments of capital export-
ing countries to protect their investors doing business in foreign legal
jurisdictions. The main interests protected are the narrow concerns of
the foreign investor and its home government.
It is for these and other reasons that the international community
has established MIGA, not as a replacement, but as a complement to
bilateral investment arrangements. It has been noted that MIGA has a
great potential for complementing the national investment guarantee
agencies and supporting bilateral legal arrangements because the rates
of guarantee afforded by these agencies, as well as their levels of utili-
zation by investors, are quite low. Some of these agencies lack the fi-
nancial capacity and underwriting authority to cover larger invest-
ments.12 In the specific area of investment insurance, MIGA would
conceivably cover a wider field than the traditional form of equity in-
vestment. Insurance eligibility would cover not just the nationals of
capital exporting countries, but also nationals of the host state if they
transferred the assets to be invested from abroad. In other words, the
coverage relates to the origin of the investment as distinct from the na-
129. See Voss, supra note 2, at 17. Jurgen Voss has estimated that in the period
of 1977-1981, these agencies guaranteed less than 15% of net investment flows from
developed to developing countries. Moreover, the utilization levels ranged from a high
of more than 50% (Austria and Japan) to a low of less than 5% (most European
agencies).
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tionality of the investor.1 30
Beyond its technical job of investment insurance and consultative
and advisory services, MIGA would, above all, serve an even more im-
portant function that cannot be addressed by bilateral investment agree-
ments. It would create a broader forum for international policy cooper-
ation on investments among capital exporting countries, capital
importing countries, and foreign investors. Moreover, by treating the
issues of international investment insurance and attendant dispute set-
tlement on the multilateral plane, MIGA would hopefully act as a
buffer against state diplomatic intervention and lessen bilateral confron-
tation in investment dispute settlement. It is too early to tell whether
this would also lead to significant depoliticization of investment dis-
putes or to a mere "multilateralizaton" of the politics of investment
disputes.
6. CONCLUSION
MIGA, at the very least, stands for a bold and innovative attempt
at restructuring the international atmosphere for investments and for
an attempted solution to the drawbacks and limitations of the bilateral
insurance approach.1"1 Bilateral and multilateral insurance schemes, if
correctly utilized, can offer considerable protection against many of the
political risks that have dampened the investment climate. To the ex-
tent that they reduce barriers to investment, these insurance schemes
ought to stimulate the flow of resources to the countries that need them.
The larger question concerns the extent to which such legal and institu-
tional arrangements have actually led to increased resource flows. In-
deed, the obvious validity of that question brings to mind the concern of
the jurisprudent who, in his study of the impact of law on society, poses
the question: "Does law make a difference?" The answer to a question
of this genus can only be arrived at through empirical investigation.
130. MICA Convention, supra note 10, art. 13(c).
131. See Shihata, INT'L LAW., supra note 14, at 488; see also Shihata, ICSID
REV., supra note 14, at 19-24.
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